Garcia v. Garcia - Full Opinion
Garcia v. Garcia
Case Number: C098735
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1 Filed 8/13/25 Garcia v. Garcia C A3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
—-
ALBERTO T. GARCIA,
as Successor Trustee, etc.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BENJAMIN GARCIA, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
C098735
(Super. Ct. No. 34202100301971)
This case involves a dispute between two siblings , Alberto T. Garcia (Albert) and
Benjamin Garcia , Jr. (Benja min), over a family home held in a trust created by their
parents, Benjamin Garcia , Sr. (father) and Gloria Garcia (mother) . After a bench trial, t he
trial court concluded that the trust be divided into two shares upon father’s death with
each part holding a 50 percent interest in the family home . The court found that
Benjamin used undue influence to get mother to amend the trust and deed the family
home to him and that mother lacked the requisite capacity to execute those documents .
2 The court deemed Benjamin to have predeceased mother under Probate Code section 259
and found him liable for double damages under Probate Code section 859.
Benjamin appeals. Without a reporter’s transcript of the trial, he contends the
court: (1) incorrectly interpreted the trust; (2) applied the wrong standard to determine
capacity ; (3) lacked substantial evidence for several findings ; and (4) ignored evidence of
Albert’s unclean hands . We disagree and affirm. Statutory references are to the Probate
Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Due to the lack of a reporter’s transcript, we draw the factual background from the
trial court’s statement of decision and other portions of the clerk’s transcript .
I
The Trust
Mother and father created the trust in 2004 . According to its terms , the trust estate
would be divided into two trusts when the first spouse died : trust A and trust B. Trust A
would consist of the surviving spouse’s interest in the trust estate, whether community or
separate property. And trust B would consist of the “portion of the Predeceased Spouse’s
taxable estate up to the whole thereof, but not to exceed the maximum exemption
equivalent allowable for federal estate tax purposes . . . .” Trust B could not be revoked
or am ended. Father left his portion of the trust estate to Albert , while mother left her
portion equally to their other twelve children , including Benjamin and sisters Alicia,
Dolores, Elva, Belinda, Elizabeth, and Imelda . The primary asset of the trust is the
family home (the property).
At some point, Benjamin took the trust to an attorney to review and learned that
the trust favored Albert . According to Belinda, Benjamin refused to make repairs to the
property because he thought Albert, the person inheriting the property, should be the one
to pay for any repairs . In 2015, father signed a document stating he wanted the property
to be left to Benjamin “to live there for the rest of his days” (2015 document). The 2015
3 document was also signed by Elva and Imelda , but Elva did not read it thoroughly and
did not see father sign it. Also, father did not read English and could not have drafted the
2015 document . Benjamin previously presented a similar document to Elizabeth , but she
refused to sign it.
II
Father ’s and Mother’ s Deaths
Father died in November 2016 . In mid -March 2021, mother started exhibiting
symptoms of weakness, fatigue, confusion, and poor mobility . One morning, mother
informed Benjamin that she was not feeling well. Benjamin called Dolores and told her
he would receive nothing if mother died. He then summoned Alicia to help care for
mother. Alicia immediately instigated a fight with Belinda, who had been living at the
property on weekend s, causing Belinda to move out and stop visiting.
At a family gathering o n March 28, 2021, mother appeared weak, one side of her
face was drooping , and one foot was dragging . Dr. Donald Hilty , Alicia’s son -in-law,
examined mother and believed she may have had a stroke. Mother was admitted to the
hospital where it was discovered she had two inoperable brain tumors. A neurologist
informed D olores, Benjamin, and mother that she had about six months to live.
Mother returned home on April 1, 2021, where Alicia and Imelda assumed her
care. Between then and April 16, 2021 , mother was isolated from Albert and other family
members . The front door was no longer left unlocked , a doorbell camera and driveway
alarm were installed , multiple baby monitors were deployed around the house, and Alicia
and Imelda closely monitored all conversations and interactions with mother. Mother
was also administered “inappropriate doses of Ambien, melatonin, and/or CBD oil.”
Mother was groggy, confused, disoriented, tired, and unable to engage in conversation.
According to a speech therapist, o n April 9, 2021, mother was administered a
mental status exam to assess her cognition. She “was found to suffer from multiple,
4 severe, mental deficits.” Examinations on April 13 and April 16 also indicated mental
deficits .
On April 13, 2021, mother informed D olores and Elizabeth that Benjamin was
sending a man to meet with her so she could sign documents regarding the property .
Mother was unable to tell them who the man was, what the documents were, or why they
were needed. Alicia interrupted the conversation to say that mother was confused and
Benjamin was obtaining a loan to make repairs to the property . But m other and Alicia
could not identify what repairs were needed. D olores and Elizabeth advised mother not
to sign a ny documents until mother spoke to Albert.
Also on April 13, 2021, Benjamin contacted an attorney and stated he wanted
mother’s trust amended to obtain a loan secured by the property to make repairs. The
next day, the attorney called mother to discuss the proposed amendment. According to
the attorney, t he conversation was “somewhat labored,” but mother stated she wanted
Benjamin to take over the trust to make repairs to the property. The attorney was still not
comfortable drafting the amendment after the conversation.
On April 15, 2021, the attorney met mother in person at the property . When he
asked her whether she wanted Benjamin to take over the trust to make property repairs,
her answer was “not as straightforward ” as he preferred. But mother stated that repairs
needed to be made , and Benjamin would make them. The attorney told Benjamin he
needed a letter f rom a physician regarding mother’s capacity before he would draft the
proposed amendment. Benjamin told the attorney he could obtain a letter, so they
schedule d a signing appointment for the next day.
On April 16, 2021, Alicia and Imelda took mother to the attorney’s office, where
they met Benjamin. Alicia’s daughter delivered a letter signed by Dr. Hilty dated April
11, 2021 . In the letter, Dr. Hilty stated he had examined mother on March 28, 2021 , and
April 4, 2021 , performed a mental status evaluation with a score of 29 out of 29 , and
assess ed her ability to make independent decisions on healthcare, finances, and legal
5 matters as intact. After the letter was delivered, m other was made to execute three
documents: (1) a trust amendment naming Benjamin as the trustee , revoking the trust’s
distribution provisions, and naming Benjamin as the sole beneficiary (trust amendment) ;
(2) a limited power of attorney naming Benjamin as mother’s attorney -in-fact with the
power to obtain a loan on the property ; and (3) a grant deed transferring title to the
property to Benjamin (April 16 grant deed) . Benjamin, Alicia, and Imelda never
discussed the execution of these documents with Albert, D olores, Belinda, or Elizabeth .
And Imelda lied to Belinda about mother’s whereabouts on April 16.
Immediately after the signing, Alicia returned to southern California, and mother’s
care fell to D olores, Belinda, and Elizabeth who n oticed an immediate improvement in
mother’s mental state, level of arousal, energy, and general health following the transition
of care . Benjamin took no action to obtain a loan or make repairs to the property. In his
deposition, he testified that making repairs was a concern, but not the main concern.
Dolores and Albert asked mother to execute estate planning documents after
April 16, 2021. Albert and other family members were not able to find the original 2004
trust, so Albert asked an estate planning document preparer to draft a new trust with the
same terms as the original 2004 trust with the intent of replacing the missing trust .
In early May 2021, Dolores found the April 16 grant deed in mother’s mail.
Mother had no memory of signing it, talking to the attorney , or going to the attorney’s
office. On numerous occasions, mother stated she never intended to give the property to
Benjamin. One of those conversation s was recorded and admitted into evidence .
Mother died on June 5, 2021.
III
The Lawsuit , Trial, and Order
On June 8, 2021, Albert filed the original petition in this case. In his amended
petition filed a few months later, he alleged Benjamin had wrongfully obtained title to the
property using undue influence and mother lacked the intent and capacity to transfer the
6 property to Benjamin. Benjamin filed an objection to the petition, denying the
allegations and requesting an evidentiary hearing.
Following a three -day bench trial, t he court ruled in Albert ’s favor : (1) finding
undue influence, lack of capacity, and elder financial abuse ; (2) setting aside the 2015
document , the trust amendment, and the April 16 grant deed ; (3) requiring Benjamin to
convey the property back to the trust ; (4) deeming Benjamin as having predeceased
mother under section 259; and (5) awarding double damages under section 859 in the
amount of $1,350,000 . The bench trial was not transcribed by a court reporter.
Benjamin requested a statement of decision on the factual basis for the capacity,
undue influence, elder abuse, and section 259 findings . Albert prepared a proposed
statement of decision per the trial court’s request . (California Rules of Court, r ule
3.1590.) Benjamin objected to the proposal , insist ing mother had capacity, there was no
evidence she wa s drugged or intended to sell the property , and the evidence did not
establish financial abuse. The court adopted the proposed statement of decision.
The statement described the trust as an A/B trust that became trust A and trust B
upon father’s death. Trust B was irrevocable and held a 50 percent interest in the trust
assets.
As to capacity, the statement began by citing section 811 and then described the
evidence offered by Dr. Hilty, the speech therapist , and three of mother’s daughters.
According to the statement, Dr. Hilty’s testimony, capacity letter, and findings lacked
credibil ity. By contrast, the speech therapist ’s testimony and related tests were
persuasive . Those tests showed deficits in several cognitive functions, including the
ability to concentrate, understand and communicate with others, and reason logically .
Belinda, Elizabeth, and D olores corroborated mother’s impairments, testifying that
mother was lethargic, catatonic, and unable to engage in conversation between April 1
and 16, 2021. Mother’s inability to tell them on April 13, 2021 , who was coming to have
her sign documents, what the documents were, or the purpose of signing them indicated
7 mother lacked the capacity to execute the documents . Also, the evidence that mother
could not remember going to an attorney or signing any documents supported the
conclusion that she did not have a sufficient understanding of what she signed . The
statement then assert ed a direct correlation between mother’s mental deficits and the
execution of the trust amendment and April 16 grant deed.
The statement also addressed the estate planning documents that Albert and other
family members had mother execute after April 16 , 202 1. Albert did not allege those
documents were valid. After finding Albert’s actions lacking in wrongful intent and
reasonable given the situation, the statement concluded that these documents had no
bearing on the proceeding or on mother’s capacity to execute the trust amendment and
April 16 grant deed.
As to undue influence , the statement of decision concluded that Benjamin bore the
burden of showing the absence of undue influence because Albert had proven that
Benjamin had a confidential relationship with mother , actively participated in procuring
the trust amendment and April 16 grant deed and would unduly benefit from those
documents . Notwithstanding that shift in burden, Albert proved that the trust amendment
and April 16 grant deed were procured by undue influence based on various factors
including Benjamin’s long-term plan to gain ownership of the property , mother’s extreme
vulnerability, evidence that mother was drugge d, and Benjamin’s secret actions at an
inappropriate time.
Turning to section 859, the statement of decision concluded that Benjamin took
the property in bad faith and through the commission of elder financial abuse as defined
in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30. As a result, the statement found
award of the following appropriate under section 859: double damages in the amount of
twice the value of the property , attorney fees , and costs. The statement deemed Benjamin
to have predeceased mother under section 259.
8 On March 2 1, 2023, the court issued an order declar ing the trust amendment void
and requiring Benjamin to convey the property to Albert as trustee of the trust, pay
$1,350,000 to the trustee of the trust under section 859, and pay attorney fees and cost s
(the March 2023 order) .
Benjamin moved to set aside the statement of decision and March 2023 order and
grant a new trial. In support, he filed a request for judicial notice of a recorded grant
deed dated April 23, 2021 , and signed by mother deeding the property to herself as
trustee of the trust . He asked the court to take notice of that document as showing the
property was in a new trust that Albert had mother create. The court denied both motions
and the request for judicial notice .
Benjamin timely appeal s the March 2023 order , the order denying the motion for
new trial, and the award of attorney’s fees and costs . Because his briefs do not challenge
the order denying the motion for new trial or the order awarding fees and costs , we
dismiss those appeals as abandoned and confine our review to his appeal of the March
2023 order. (See Tanner v. Tanner (1997) 57 Cal.App .4th 419, 422, fn. 2. )
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench
trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence
standard of review to the trial court ’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this deferential
standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment and
we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” ( Thom pson v. Asimos (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) We do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility.
(Ibid.)
9 The appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record. (Ketchum v.
Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140 -1141.) In the absence of a reporter’s transcript, we
must presume substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding s. (569 East County
Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App. 5th 426, 434,
fn. 9.) The appellant also bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial
error. (Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069.) Reversal is not required
where there is an independent basis to support a judgment. (Widson v. International
Harvester Co. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 45, 54.)
II
Trust Division after Father’ s Death
Benjamin contends there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that trust B
held fifty percent of the trust’s assets. In his view, because the value of the trust estate
was below the amount of the applicable federal tax e xemption , none of the trust estate
went to trust B . We disagree .
In construing the terms of a trust, we exercise our independent judgment. ( Estate
of Guidotti (2001) 90 Cal.App. 4th 1403, 1406.) We look at the language used in the trust
instrument , and if that lang uage clearly sets forth the intent, we do not consider extrinsic
evidence . (Wells Fargo Bank v. Huse (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 927, 932; Trolan v. Trolan
(2019) 31 Cal.App. 5th 939, 949.)
Here, the language of the trust is clear . Upon the death of a spouse, trust B
consists of that spouse’s “taxable estate up to . . . the maximum exemption equivalent
allowable for federal estate tax purposes . . . .” Contrary to Benjamin’s view , this
language does not provide that trust B consists of the taxable estate that exceed s the
maximum federal estate tax exemption. Also, B enjamin’s view that the “taxable estate”
consist s only of the estate’s value in excess of the federal tax exemption has no support in
the text of the trust or othe r authority. Under federal estate tax law, the taxable estate is
the gross estate less various deductions, and the gross estate consists of all interests in
10 property owned by the decedent at the time of his death. ( 26 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2031,
2033.) As he admits, Benjamin never argued that mother and father had a different
understanding of “taxable estate ” that prevailed over the te chnical meaning of that term .
(Prob. Code, § 21122 [t echnical terms used in a testamentary instrument will ordinarily
be given their technical meaning ].) We reject his effort to make that fact-based argument
for the first time on appeal. (Estate of Cooper (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1123 .)
Benjamin mistakenly relies on an estate planning information sheet that mother
and father completed at the time they created the trust . Because the information sheet
was never formally moved into evidence , we cannot consider it on appeal. (USLIFE
Savings & Loan Assn. v. National Surety Corp. (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 336, 343.)
Benjamin’s assertion that we can consider this document because the trust’s language is
ambiguous lacks merit . The language regarding the property held in trust B is clear and
not susceptible to Benjamin’s interpretation. (Trolan v. Trolan , supra , 31 Cal.App.5th at
p. 949 [court cannot consider extrinsic evidence of trust to give it a meaning to which it is
not reasonabl y susceptible ].) The fact that Albert attached the information sheet to his
original petition does not change our conclusion . Such attachment did not equate to a
judicial admission that the information sheet overrode the plain language of the trust.
(See Faigin v. Signature Group Holdings, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App. 4th 726, 737-738.)
III
Capacity to Execute the Trust Amendment
Benjamin contends the trial court applied the wrong standard to determine whether
mother had the capacity to execute the trust amendment. We need not address the merits
of this contention. E ven if the court did apply the wrong standard to determine mother’s
capacity to execute the trust amendment, the court also determined that the trust
amendment was procured by undue influen ce. That undue influence determination is
significant because either a finding of lack of capacity or a finding of undue influence is
sufficient to invalidate the trust amendment. (Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d
11 471, 485-486; Estate of Olson (1912) 19 Cal.App. 379, 3 86 [“ ‘Undue influence is quite
distinct from testamentary capacity’ ”].) Because we conclude that Benjamin’s
challenges to the undue influence finding s are unpersuasiv e, as we discuss post, this
independent basis for finding the trust amendment invalid renders any error in the
capacity standard harmless. (See Estate of Lauth (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 313, 319.)
IV
Substantial Evidence Claims
Benjamin contends there was insufficient evidence to support the following
findings: (1) mother lacked the capacity to execute the trust amendment and grant deed;
(2) Benjamin had a confidential relationship with mother; ( 3) Benjamin actively
participated in procuring the trust amendment and grant deed ; (4) the trust amendment
and grant deed were procured by undue influence ; (5) mother was drugged; (6) Benjamin
committed financial elder abuse ; (7) the property was worth $ 675,000; and (8) section
259 applied to disinherit Benjamin. His contentions fall into three categories discussed
below. As w e explain, none of these contentions have merit.
First, Benjamin contends certain findings in the statement of decision were
deficient as a matter of law. For instance, h e contends the court could not rely on the
tests the speech therapist performed to conclude mother lacked capacity because those
tests did not specifically address the elements listed in section 6100.5. We disagree.
Benjamin provides no authority suggesting such specificity is required . (Badie v. Bank of
America (1998) 67 Cal.App. 4th 779, 784-785 [points are waived when not supported
with citations to authority ].) Also, legal findings on capacity can be inferred from
witness observations of the testator ’s cognitive abilitie s. (See, e.g., Estate of Lockwood
(1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 309, 315.)
Similarly , Benjamin contends the court could not have relied on the speech
therapist’s testimony because she was “not a medical provid er” and only an expert could
testify as to whether mother was drugged . These contentions also lack citation to
12 authority and are ultimately unpersuasive. Lay witness es can generally testify to the
mental condition or competency of a testator. (People v. Webb (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d
402, 412; see also Jordan v. Great Western Motorways (1931) 213 Cal. 606, 612 [“Lay
witnesses having the requisite opportunity for observation may testify as to the health of
another”]; People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 631 [lay witness can testify to
facts personally observed ].) Benjamin’s concerns go to the weight of the evidenc e, and
that is not part of our review .
Second, Benjamin contends there was either a lack of evidence to support certain
findings or the trial court failed to identify the supporting evidence or facts. He contends
the absence of a reporter’s transcript is not a problem because he requested a statement of
decision , objected to the proposed statement , and raised the same concerns in his motion
for new trial. We are not persuaded .
In the absence of a reporter’s transcript or settled statement, we must presume that
the necessary evidence was presented . (Estate of Fain, supra , 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992).
Benjamin’s request for a review for substantial evidence is impossible: we cannot
conduct a meaningful evidentiary review when the testimonial evidence is missing. (See
Foust v. San Jose Co nstruction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186 -188.) For this
reason , Benjamin’s attempt to equate the evidence tendered in this case to that deemed
insufficient in other cases like Estate of Mann (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 593 falls short .1
The related contention that the statement of decision needs to describe every
supporting fact or piece of evidence is misguided . A statement of decision is required
only on the principal controverted issues specified in the request ; other issues are waived.
(In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1274.) Also, a “ ‘statement of
1 In Estate of Mann , a jury found the decedent lacked the capacity to execute a will and
the execution was obtained through undue influence. ( Id. at p. 599.) The reviewing court
reversed after finding the verdict unsupported by the evidence. ( Ibid.)
13 decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court’s determination as to the ultimate facts
and material issues in the case.’ ” (Thompson v. Asimos, supra , 6 Cal.App. 5th at p. 983.)
The “ ‘ “ultimate fact” generally refers to a core fact, such as an essential element of a
claim.’ ” (Ibid.) A court “is not expected to make findings with regard to ‘detailed
evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
Even if a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, “ ‘the omission is harmless
error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining
party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Here, Benjamin did not identify valuation of the property as a controverted issue
to be discussed in the statement of decision. His failure to do so is fatal to his valuation
challenge on appeal. ( In re Marriage of Hebbring , supra , 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1274.)
He also does not suggest that any purportedly missing findings were ultimate facts or
material issues in this case. Nor can he show harm from any omissions. Again, we
cannot reverse a judgment without reviewing the entire record. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13; People v. Hopper (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 774, 778 .)
And third, Benjamin insists the court relied on false evidence , reached improper
inferences , and improperly discounted and credited various testimonies. These claims
have no traction in a review for substantial evidence. We do not reweigh the evidence,
make our own factual inferences that contradict those of the trial court, or second guess
the trial court’s credibility determinations. (Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 602, 613 .)
V
Unclean Hands
Benjamin contends the trial court improperly deemed evidence of Albert’s unclean
hands irrelevant. In support, he asks us to take judicial notice of two documents: (1) an
April 23, 2021 grant deed by mother as trustee of the trust granting the property to
14 mother; and (2) an April 23, 2021 grant deed by mother deeding the property to the trust
(the April 23 grant deeds) . He contends th ese documents show that Albert “bullied”
mother int o signing t hem. Given the state of the record , we must reject this contention
and deny the request for judicial notice . The trial court found that Albert’s actions after
April 16, 2021 , were reasonable and had no wrongful intent . Without a reporter’s
transcript, we must presume these finding s were supported by substantial evidence. As
stated , we do not reweigh the evidence. ( Carrington v. Starbuck Corp . (2018)
30 Cal.App. 5th 504, 518. )
Benjamin also contends the trial court should have considered the validity of the
April 23 grant deeds because knowing which trust holds the property is clearly relevant to
the proceeding . But the record indicates the trial court was never asked to determine the
validity of those documents. In its statement of decision, the trial court noted that Albert
was not alleging they were valid , and t here is no indication that Benjami n asserted that
allegation either. A specific argument that was never raised bef ore the trial court cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal. (L. Byron Culver & Associates v. Jaoudi Industrial
& Trading Corp. (1991) 1 Cal.App. 4th 300, 306, fn. 4.)
15 DISPOSITION
The March 2023 order is affirmed. Albert is awarded his costs on appea l. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)( 1), (2). )
/s/
MESIWALA , J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
FEINBERG , J.