Case Citations

Key Case Law in Probate Opinions

Last updated: August 23, 2025

Hover over case names to see the legal principles for which they are cited.

Database Status: 75 verified citations, 75 with legal principles

Creditor Claims

Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Highsmith* (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 331, 339] (*Altizer*).) Common defenses to an action on the judgment include the judgment is not enforceable and suit on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. (*Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne* (2001)89 Cal.App.4th 195, 202--203.) The party seeking to vacate the renewed judgment has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (*Id*. at p. 199.) We review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision and deferring to the court's resolution of factual conflicts. ([*American Contractors Indemnity Co. v. : A judgment may be vacated when the judgment is not enforceable or when the action to enforce it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. These constitute recognized defenses to an action on the judgment.

Conservatorships

Conservatorship of A.B. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 384

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) He appears to suggest that these statutory provisions require the court to make individualized findings in each conservatorship case before authorizing any fee payments and that authorization of *prospective*, periodic fee payments is barred. R.J. merely cites one case in support of his arguments, *Conservatorship of A.B.* (2021)66 Cal.App.5th 384. However, this case concerns errors committed by the trial court at an accounting proceeding and is not apposite here. The public conservator responds: “Appellant forfeited any challenges to the trial court’s findings and orders made regarding the fee schedule when imposing the conservatorship. No objections were made and no issues were raised about the fee schedule in the trial court. : A trial court must correctly address and rectify any errors that arise during a conservatorship accounting proceeding, rather than relying on a generic fee schedule without individualized findings.

Other

Altizer v. Highsmith (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 331

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Section 366.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure [(one-year statute of limitations)] does not apply to an action under this section." (Prob. Code, § 9391.) 3.Vacating Renewal of JudgmentThe trial court may vacate a renewal of a judgment "on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment." (§ 683.170, subd. (a); see [*Altizer v. Highsmith* (2020)52 Cal.App.5th 331, 339] (*Altizer*).) Common defenses to an action on the judgment include the judgment is not enforceable and suit on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. (*Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. : A renewed judgment may be vacated if the moving party could assert any defense that would defeat a direct action on the underlying judgment, such as lack of enforceability or a statute‑of‑limitations bar.

Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) First, Benjamin contends certain findings in the statement of decision were deficient as a matter of law. For instance, he contends the court could not rely on the tests the speech therapist performed to conclude mother lacked capacity because those tests did not specifically address the elements listed in section 6100.5. We disagree. Benjamin provides no authority suggesting such specificity is required. (*Badie v. Bank of America* (1998)67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [points are waived when not supported with citations to authority].) Also, legal findings on capacity can be inferred from witness observations of the testator’s cognitive abilities. (See, e.g., *Estate of Lockwood* (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 309, 315.) Similarly, Benjamin contends the court could not have relied on the speech therapist’s testimony because she was “not a medical provider” and only an expert could testify as to whether mother was drugged. : A party forfeits any argument that is not supported by legal authority; unsupported points are deemed waived.

Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836

Conservatorship of the Estate of You Wei Dong (2025-08-15, A169579) Chui* (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 929, 936 [“The Probate Code provides for the appointment of guardians ad litem (Prob. Code, § 1003), but includes no substantive or procedural provisions governing their removal.”].) Nor does she cite any authority in support of her argument. (*Benach v. County of Los Angeles* (2007)149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’’].) At most, Yen appears to contest CSC’s compliance with the general rules governing ex parte application. Specifically, Yen alleges the application failed to contain a declaration showing irreparable harm, a memorandum, or a proposed order. : A party waives an issue when it neither raises the point nor supports it with reasoned argument and citations to authority. Consequently, unsupported assertions are deemed forfeited.

Beneficial Financial, Inc. v. Durkee (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 912

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Durkee* (1988)206 Cal.App.3d 912, 916--917 [while the judgment was renewed, the judgment lien expired because a certified copy of the renewal application was not recorded while the lien was still in effect].) Unless a judgment has been timely renewed, on expiration of the 10-year enforcement period any judgment liens based on the judgment are automatically extinguished. (§ 683.020; see *Starcevic v. : A judgment lien is extinguished if the certified copy of the renewal application is not recorded before the lien’s 10‑year term expires, even when the underlying judgment itself has been timely renewed.

Boshernitsan v. Bach (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 883

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Bach* (2021)61 Cal.App.5th 883, 892.) Trustees are not required to obtain court approval or authority to pursue claims relating to trust property under either California or Colorado law. (Prob. Code, § 16200, subd. (b) [a trustee may exercise “the powers conferred by statute” “without the need to obtain court authorization”]; Colo. Rev. : A settlor who is also a lifetime beneficiary of a revocable inter‑vivos trust is deemed to have the same rights and powers as a full owner of the trust property. This ownership‑like interest allows the settlor‑beneficiary to control, use, and dispose of the assets without the property being subject to probate.

Chui v. Chui (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 929

Conservatorship of the Estate of You Wei Dong (2025-08-15, A169579) As an initial matter, CSC argues Yen waived this argument by failing to explain why removing a GAL via an ex parte application is improper. We agree. While Yen asserts the ex parte application did not comply with procedural rules, she fails to cite which procedural rules she is referencing. (See, e.g., *Chui v. Chui* (2022)86 Cal.App.5th 929, 936 [“The Probate Code provides for the appointment of guardians ad litem (Prob. Code, § 1003), but includes no substantive or procedural provisions governing their removal.”].) Nor does she cite any authority in support of her argument. (*Benach v. : The Probate Code authorizes the appointment of a guardian ad litem but contains no substantive or procedural provisions that govern the removal of a guardian ad litem. Consequently, removal is not subject to specific statutory rules.

Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 602

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Hopper* (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 774, 778.) And third, Benjamin insists the court relied on false evidence, reached improper inferences, and improperly discounted and credited various testimonies. These claims have no traction in a review for substantial evidence. We do not reweigh the evidence, make our own factual inferences that contradict those of the trial court, or second guess the trial court’s credibility determinations. (*Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian* (2013)218 Cal.App.4th 602, 613.) V *Unclean Hands* Benjamin contends the trial court improperly deemed evidence of Albert’s unclean hands irrelevant. In support, he asks us to take judicial notice of two documents: (1) an April 23, 2021 grant deed by mother as trustee of the trust granting the property to mother; and (2) an April 23, 2021 grant deed by mother deeding the property to the trust (the April 23 grant deeds). : An appellate court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings, reviewing them only for substantial‑evidence support and never reweighing the evidence, drawing its own factual inferences, or second‑guessing the trial court’s credibility determinations.

Corporation of America v. Marks (1937) 10 Cal.2d 218

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) There are limited exceptions to the creditor claim filing requirement, including for the holder of a judgment lien. A "lien creditor may, without filing a claim in probate, bring an equitable action to foreclose the judgment lien, but he has no right to a deficiency." ([*County Line Holdings, LLC v. McClanahan* (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1072--1073] (*County Line Holdings*), citing *Corporation of America v. Marks* (1937)10 Cal.2d 218, 221 (*Corporation of America*).) "The creditor may bring the action at any time during the statutory duration of the judgment lien." (*County Line Holdings*, at p. 1073.) Probate Code section 9391 provides that "the holder of a mortgage or other lien on property in the decedent's estate, including, but not limited to, a judgment lien, may commence an action : A lien creditor may enforce a judgment lien against estate property by filing an equitable action without first filing a probate claim, but the creditor is barred from obtaining any deficiency judgment.

County Line Holdings, LLC v. McClanahan (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1067

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Legal authority supports Barrow's position. There are limited exceptions to the creditor claim filing requirement, including for the holder of a judgment lien. A "lien creditor may, without filing a claim in probate, bring an equitable action to foreclose the judgment lien, but he has no right to a deficiency." ([*County Line Holdings, LLC v. McClanahan* (2018)22 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1072--1073] (*County Line Holdings*), citing *Corporation of America v. : A holder of a judgment lien may enforce the lien by filing an equitable foreclosure action without first filing a probate claim, but the holder has no right to recover a deficiency, and the action may be brought at any time during the lien’s statutory period.

Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Linda challenges that postjudgment order by a separate appeal pending in this court (case No. G063597). [^8]: Respondents cite two cases in support of this argument, *Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles* (1953) 41 Cal.2d 855, 857–858 and *Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc.* (2017)16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1206–1207. Neither case is relevant, as each involves a situation where the court’s oral pronouncement contradicted its subsequent written order. That is not the case here. [^9]: The only exceptions were certain specified assets, which did not include the Notes. [^10]: On June 26, 2023—after the trial court initially had taken the motion for judgment under submission—Linda filed a petition for formal probate of the will with the District Court in Colorado Springs, Colorado. : A court’s oral pronouncement that conflicts with its later written order is not controlling; the written order is the operative judgment.

Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) That issue is beyond the scope of the grounds Rhonda raises on appeal. (See *Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd.* (1994)28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 ["We will not develop the appellants' arguments for them," refusing to consider a "passing reference" in the briefs to issues without argument or citation to authority]; Cal. : A party may not rely on a mere “passing reference” to an issue; an appellate brief must set out each point under its own heading and support it with argument and authority, and the court will not develop or consider arguments that are not fully pleaded.

Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 530

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) A " 'Claim' " means a demand for payment for, among other things, liability of the decedent. (Prob. Code, § 9000, subd. (a)(1).) Subject to limited exceptions, claims covered by the creditor claims rules must be timely and properly filed or they are "barred." (*Id*., § 9002; see *Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc.* (2001)89 Cal.App.4th 530, 536 ["A timely filed claim is a condition precedent to filing an action against a decedent's estate."].) Probate Code section 9391, part of the creditor claims statutes, sets forth a lien enforcement exception to the claim filing requirement. : A claim against a decedent’s estate must be filed within the statutory deadline; timely filing is a condition precedent to any suit against the estate.

Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) In her declaration, Rhonda stated she was specially appearing to file the motion to vacate the judgment and was Martin's successor in interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. We conclude that Rhonda has standing to appeal. While Barrow does not challenge appellate standing, standing to appeal is jurisdictional. (*Doe v. Regents of University of California* (2022)80 Cal.App.5th 282, 293.) Rhonda has standing to appeal as the person who brought the motion to vacate and who, as a beneficiary of Martin's estate to whom his real property transferred, is aggrieved by the trial court's order denying the motion. (See *ibid*. [a nonparty that is aggrieved by an order may become a party and obtain a right to appeal : Standing to appeal is a jurisdictional requirement, and a non‑party who is aggrieved by a judgment may acquire appellate standing by moving to vacate that judgment.

Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) It is usually unfair to the trial court and the adverse party to take advantage of an ostensible error on appeal that could have been addressed and resolved at the trial level and a proper record made for purposes of review. (*People v. Saunders* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590; *Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist.* (1979)23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1.) Accordingly, we conclude R.J.’s challenges to the trial court’s order, inasmuch as it granted the public conservator’s request for periodic payments under certain conditions and subject to subsequent court approval, are forfeited for purposes of appeal.[^5] We note that while this appeal was pending, the parties stipulated that the conservatorship would terminate as of February 18, 2025, and that a final accounting proceeding would take place before the trial court on May 14, 2025. : A claim of error that was not timely objected to or preserved at trial is waived and may not be raised on appeal. Issues must be raised in the appropriate form at the trial level to be reviewable.

Embree v. Embree (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 487

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Rhonda also misplaces reliance on authority governing a judgment creditor's attempt to create a judgment lien after the judgment debtor's death. It is settled that if no judgment lien has been executed prior to the judgment debtor's death, then a judgment creditor seeking to satisfy its money judgment with the decedent's property must file a timely creditor claim. (See *Embree v. Embree* (2004)125 Cal.App.4th 487, 493 ["*Except with respect to liens that have already been executed*, any judgment creditor seeking to satisfy its money judgment with property of the decedent must file a timely claim in the probate proceeding" (italics added)]; *Estate of Casserley* (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 824, 832 [filing of an abstract of judgment after judgment debtor's death does not create a lien : A judgment creditor who has not previously attached a judgment lien to a debtor’s property before the debtor’s death cannot later create such a lien; the creditor must instead file a timely claim in the probate proceeding to seek satisfaction of the judgment from the estate.

Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Even if the court did apply the wrong standard to determine mother’s capacity to execute the trust amendment, the court also determined that the trust amendment was procured by undue influence. That undue influence determination is significant because *either* a finding of lack of capacity *or* a finding of undue influence is sufficient to invalidate the trust amendment. (*Estate of Baker* (1982)131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485-486; *Estate of Olson* (1912) 19 Cal.App. 379, 386 [“ ‘Undue influence is quite distinct from testamentary capacity’ ”].) Because we conclude that Benjamin’s challenges to the undue influence findings are unpersuasive, as we discuss *post*, this independent basis for finding the trust amendment invalid renders any error in the capacity standard harmless. (See *Estate of Lauth* (1960) 180 : A trust amendment is voidable if the maker lacked testamentary capacity or was subjected to undue influence; either ground alone is sufficient to invalidate the amendment.

Estate of Casserley (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 824

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Embree* (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 487, 493 ["*Except with respect to liens that have already been executed*, any judgment creditor seeking to satisfy its money judgment with property of the decedent must file a timely claim in the probate proceeding" (italics added)]; *Estate of Casserley* (2018)22 Cal.App.5th 824, 832 [filing of an abstract of judgment after judgment debtor's death does not create a lien on estate property].) Here, by contrast, a judgment lien on Martin's interest in real property was created before he died when Barrow recorded the abstract of judgment in June 2015 and attached to the Rusting Avenue property when Martin acquired it in 2017. : A judgment lien cannot be created against a decedent’s estate by filing an abstract of judgment after the debtor’s death; the creditor must instead file a timely claim in the probate proceeding to seek payment.

Estate of Cooper (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1114

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Code, § 21122 [technical terms used in a testamentary instrument will ordinarily be given their technical meaning].) We reject his effort to make that fact-based argument for the first time on appeal. (*Estate of Cooper* (1970)11 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1123.) Benjamin mistakenly relies on an estate planning information sheet that mother and father completed at the time they created the trust. Because the information sheet was never formally moved into evidence, we cannot consider it on appeal. (*USLIFE Savings & Loan Assn. v. National Surety Corp.* (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 336, 343.) Benjamin’s assertion that we can consider this document because the trust’s language is ambiguous lacks merit. : A party cannot introduce a factual argument for the first time on appeal; issues and factual contentions must be raised in the trial court before an appellate court will consider them.

Estate of Guidotti (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1403

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) In his view, because the value of the trust estate was below the amount of the applicable federal tax exemption, none of the trust estate went to trust B. We disagree. In construing the terms of a trust, we exercise our independent judgment. (*Estate of Guidotti* (2001)90 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406.) We look at the language used in the trust instrument, and if that language clearly sets forth the intent, we do not consider extrinsic evidence. (*Wells Fargo Bank v. Huse* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 927, 932; *Trolan v. Trolan* (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 939, 949.) Here, the language of the trust is clear. : When interpreting a trust, the court must exercise its own independent judgment to determine the meaning of the instrument’s language.

Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) III\. Linda Did Not Need Probate Court Authorization to Sue on the Notes Respondents argue Linda was required to obtain permission from a probate court to sue on the Notes either by filing a *Heggstad* petition (*Estate of Heggstad* (1993)16 Cal.App.4th 943(*Heggstad*)) or by initiating a probate proceeding. We disagree. Linda was not required to file a *Heggstad* petition. *Heggstad* addressed the transfer of real property into a trust and held “a written declaration of trust by the owner of real property, in which he names himself trustee, is sufficient to create a trust in that property, and . . . the law does not require a separate deed transferring the property to the trust.” (*Heggstad*, *supra,* 16 Cal.App.4th at p. : A claim on a note may be pursued directly in a civil action without first obtaining probate‑court permission or filing a Heggstad petition. The probate process is not a prerequisite to suing on such a note.

Estate of Kirkpatrick’s (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 709

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Martha A. (2025-08-22, G063437) When an interested party has objections to an account, the objector must “specifically . . . allege them. Failure to do so operates as a waiver of any opposition thereto.” (*Estate of Kirkpatrick’s* (1952)109 Cal.App.2d 709, 713.) Rule 7.801 states: “If the court continues a matter to allow a written objection or response to be made, and the responding or objecting party fails to serve and file a timely objection or response, the court may deem the objections or responses waived.” Here, as set forth in detail above, the court established a procedure for objecting to the second account, which included the fee request. : An interested party must expressly allege specific objections to an accounting in writing; failure to do so constitutes a waiver of those objections.

Estate of Lauth (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 313

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) 386 [“ ‘Undue influence is quite distinct from testamentary capacity’ ”].) Because we conclude that Benjamin’s challenges to the undue influence findings are unpersuasive, as we discuss *post*, this independent basis for finding the trust amendment invalid renders any error in the capacity standard harmless. (See *Estate of Lauth* (1960)180 Cal.App.2d 313, 319.) IV *Substantial Evidence Claims* Benjamin contends there was insufficient evidence to support the following findings: (1) mother lacked the capacity to execute the trust amendment and grant deed; (2) Benjamin had a confidential relationship with mother; (3) Benjamin actively participated in procuring the trust amendment and grant deed; (4) the trust amendment and grant deed were procured by : An error in applying the capacity standard is harmless when the trust amendment is already invalidated on an independent ground, such as a finding of undue influence. Consequently, the amendment may be set aside despite the mistaken capacity analysis.

Estate of Lockwood (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 309

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) We disagree. Benjamin provides no authority suggesting such specificity is required. (*Badie v. Bank of America* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [points are waived when not supported with citations to authority].) Also, legal findings on capacity can be inferred from witness observations of the testator’s cognitive abilities. (See, e.g., *Estate of Lockwood* (1967)254 Cal.App.2d 309, 315.) Similarly, Benjamin contends the court could not have relied on the speech therapist’s testimony because she was “not a medical provider” and only an expert could testify as to whether mother was drugged. These contentions also lack citation to authority and are ultimately unpersuasive. Lay witnesses can generally testify to the mental condition or competency of a testator. (*People v. : A court may infer a testator’s testamentary capacity from lay witnesses’ observations of the testator’s cognitive abilities and behavior, without requiring formal medical or psychological testing.

Estate of Mann (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 593

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Benjamin’s request for a review for substantial evidence is impossible: we cannot conduct a meaningful evidentiary review when the testimonial evidence is missing. (See *Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186-188.) For this reason, Benjamin’s attempt to equate the evidence tendered in this case to that deemed insufficient in other cases like *Estate of Mann* (1986)184 Cal.App.3d 593falls short.[^1] The related contention that the statement of decision needs to describe every supporting fact or piece of evidence is misguided. : A court’s factual findings must be supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record; if the record lacks such evidence, the findings are deemed insufficient and cannot be upheld.

Estate of Olson (1912) 19 Cal.App. 379

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) That undue influence determination is significant because *either* a finding of lack of capacity *or* a finding of undue influence is sufficient to invalidate the trust amendment. (*Estate of Baker* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485-486; *Estate of Olson* (1912)19 Cal.App. 379, 386 [“ ‘Undue influence is quite distinct from testamentary capacity’ ”].) Because we conclude that Benjamin’s challenges to the undue influence findings are unpersuasive, as we discuss *post*, this independent basis for finding the trust amendment invalid renders any error in the capacity standard harmless. (See *Estate of Lauth* (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 313, 319.) IV *Substantial Evidence Claims* Benjamin : Undue influence is a distinct, independent ground from testamentary capacity, and a finding of either undue influence or lack of capacity alone is sufficient to invalidate a trust amendment.

Estate of Parrette (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 157

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) One of the primary functions of a revocable inter vivos trust—such as the Trust here—is to “avoid probate upon death.” (*Weber v. Langholz* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1583; see also *Zanelli v. McGrath* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 615, 633 [a “revocable inter vivos trust [is] a probate avoidance device”] & *Estate of Parrette* (1985)165 Cal.App.3d 157, 164 [“‘When a person creates, and transfers property to, an inter vivos trust and the trust estate does not revert to the settlor’s estate on his death, the trust property is not subject to probate administration in the settlor’s estate. [Citation.] The property is not subject to probate administration even if the decedent-settlor was a life beneficiary of the : Property transferred to a revocable inter vivos trust does not become part of the settlor’s probate estate; therefore, it is not subject to probate administration even if the settlor retains a life interest or the power to revoke the trust.

Faigin v. Signature Group Holdings, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 726

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Such attachment did not equate to a judicial admission that the information sheet overrode the plain language of the trust. (See *Faigin v. Signature Group Holdings, Inc.* (2012)211 Cal.App.4th 726, 737-738.) III *Capacity to Execute the Trust Amendment* Benjamin contends the trial court applied the wrong standard to determine whether mother had the capacity to execute the trust amendment. We need not address the merits of this contention. Even if the court did apply the wrong standard to determine mother’s capacity to execute the trust amendment, the court also determined that the trust amendment was procured by undue influence. : Attaching an extrinsic document to a pleading does not constitute a judicial admission that the document supersedes or alters the trust’s express terms; the plain language of the trust controls and cannot be displaced by such attachment.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Charlton (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1066

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Corp. v. Charlton* (1993)17 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1070; see § 697.400, subds. (a), (c).) A judgment lien continues until 10 years from the date of entry of the judgment and may be extended for 10 years if renewed. (§§ 683.180, subd. (a), 697.310, subds. (a), (b).) To renew a judgment lien, a certified copy of the application for renewal of judgment must be recorded in the : A judgment lien is terminated only when the creditor records an acknowledgment that the underlying judgment has been satisfied or when the creditor formally releases the lien.

Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) We are not persuaded. In the absence of a reporter’s transcript or settled statement, we must presume that the necessary evidence was presented. (*Estate of Fain, supra*, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992). Benjamin’s request for a review for substantial evidence is impossible: we cannot conduct a meaningful evidentiary review when the testimonial evidence is missing. (See *Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc.* (2011)198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186-188.) For this reason, Benjamin’s attempt to equate the evidence tendered in this case to that deemed insufficient in other cases like *Estate of Mann* (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 593 falls short.[^1] The related contention that the statement of decision needs to describe every supporting fact or piece of evidence is misguided. : A court cannot perform a substantial‑evidence evidentiary review when the trial’s testimonial record (transcript or settled statement) is unavailable; in such cases the court must presume the evidence was presented and cannot assess its sufficiency.

Goldberg v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1378

Conservatorship of the Estate of You Wei Dong (2025-08-15, A169579) Code, § 3601, subds. (a), (b)(1).) The express language of Probate Code sections 3600 and 3601, coupled with Code of Civil Procedure section 372, thus indicates GALs are entitled to seek reimbursement for reasonable expenses arising from their services, regardless of whether they are appointed under the Probate Code or Code of Civil Procedure section 372. In *Goldberg v. Superior Court* (1994)23 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1382, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained Probate Code section 3601 “bestows broad power on the court to authorize payment from the settlement—to say who and what will be paid . . . .” The *Goldberg* court further explained a court need not simply accept or reject requests for reimbursement; rather, “the court is obliged to decide both what is reasonable *and* how much it will allow. : A court possesses broad discretion to decide which settlement expenses are reasonable and the amount to be reimbursed, and may allocate reimbursement in any manner it deems appropriate.

Goldman v. Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Although the two methods are distinct, the defenses available to the judgment debtor in the statutory procedure are the same as in an independent action on the judgment." ([*Goldman v. Simpson* (2008)160 Cal.App.4th 255, 260--261]; see also §§ 683.110, subd. (a), 683.120, 683.130, subd. (a).) Filing an application for renewal of the judgment extends the judgment's enforceability period for 10 years from the date the application is filed. (§ 683.120, subds. (a), (b).) Once a judgment expires, it may not be enforced. (§ 683.020, subd. (a).) A judgment lien on real property is : In a judgment‑renewal proceeding, a judgment debtor may assert exactly the same defenses that are available in an independent action on the judgment.

Hassoldt v. Patrick Media Group, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 153

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Further, in California when a trustee brings an action in its own name regarding trust property, it is not required to mention the trust. (See *Hassoldt v. Patrick Media Group, Inc.* (2000)84 Cal.App.4th 153, 171, disapproved on another ground in *People v. Rogers* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 330–331 [a trustee can maintain an action on trust property in their own name “without mentioning the trust”]; & *McKoin v. Rosefelt* (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 757, 769 [“‘it is unnecessary for the trustee in the pleadings . . . to describe himself as trustee. He can proceed in the action as though he were the owner of the claim which he is enforcing. : A trustee may bring a lawsuit over trust property in the trustee’s own name and is not required to identify or describe the trust in the pleading. The trust designation is merely optional and, if included, is treated as surplusage.

In re Emily R. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1344

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Martha A. (2025-08-22, G063437) Courts certainly have the power to reconsider or modify their own interim orders. (*Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 388.) But if the court chooses to do so, particularly on a matter of significance, as a matter of due process, notice to the parties is required. (See Cal. Const., Art. I, § 7; *In re Emily R.* (2000)80 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1351.) Jodee explicitly and knowingly refused to submit written objections. She also refused to submit anything in writing to justify why she should be permitted to argue when she had failed to do so. The court had warned Jodee twice that the failure to submit anything in writing would result in a waiver of the opportunity to argue. : Due process requires that parties be given notice before a court modifies its own interim order, particularly when the change concerns a matter of significance.

In re Marriage of Caballero (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1139

Conservatorship of the Estate of You Wei Dong (2025-08-15, A169579) not have the powers of a general guardian or conservator with respect to the estate.”].) The GAL’s primary role is to represent the best interests of the incapacitated person in litigation, not to assume the powers granted to a conservator under the Probate Code. (*In re Marriage of Caballero* (1994)27 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149 [“ ‘A guardian ad litem is not a party to the action, but merely a party’s representative [citation], an officer of the court [citation]. . . . “The duties of a guardian ad litem are essentially ministerial.” ’ ”].) This distinction is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which allows a GAL to compromise or settle claims with court approval but does not confer authority over postsettlement fund management. (Code Civ. : A guardian ad litem acts only as a representative of the incapacitated party with essentially ministerial duties and does not possess the authority of a general guardian or conservator to control or manage the party’s estate or settlement funds.

In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) A statement of decision is required only on the principal controverted issues specified in the request; other issues are waived. (*In re Marriage of Hebbring* (1989)207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1274.) Also, a “ ‘statement of decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court’s determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case.’ ” (*Thompson v. : A statement of decision must address only the principal contested issues expressly raised in the request, disclosing the court’s findings on the ultimate facts and material issues; it is not required to make detailed findings on every evidentiary point, and any omission is harmless unless it would alter the outcome.

Jordan v. Great Western Motorways (1931) 213 Cal. 606

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) These contentions also lack citation to authority and are ultimately unpersuasive. Lay witnesses can generally testify to the mental condition or competency of a testator. (*People v. Webb* (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 402, 412; see also *Jordan v. Great Western Motorways* (1931)213 Cal. 606, 612 [“Lay witnesses having the requisite opportunity for observation may testify as to the health of another”]; *People v. Rodriguez* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 631 [lay witness can testify to facts personally observed].) Benjamin’s concerns go to the weight of the evidence, and that is not part of our review. Second, Benjamin contends there was either a lack of evidence to support certain findings or the trial court failed to identify the supporting evidence or facts. : Lay witnesses may testify about another person’s health or mental condition when they have personally observed the relevant facts, without needing to be qualified as medical experts.

Kasperbauer v. Fairfield (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 229

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Martha A. (2025-08-22, G063437) The court then stated it had reviewed all time entries and allowed a total of \$94,955 in legal fees and \$478.21 in costs. An order was duly entered, from which Huntington now appeals. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review The standard of review for an award of statutory fees is abuse of discretion. (*Kasperbauer v. Fairfield* (2009)171 Cal.App.4th 229, 234.) This is true regardless of whether the appeal is from an application for fees in the first instance, or an appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial on the issue. With respect to factual findings, there is no abuse of discretion when the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. (*Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. : The appropriate standard of appellate review for an award of statutory attorney fees is abuse of discretion.

Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Martha A. (2025-08-22, G063437) Following its own procedures is never more important than in a complex, highly contested case. The court had already decided that Jodee waived her right to argue objections if she did not submit them in writing, once on February 2, 2023, and again on March 27. Courts certainly have the power to reconsider or modify their own interim orders. (*Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group* (2003)106 Cal.App.4th 368, 388.) But if the court chooses to do so, particularly on a matter of significance, as a matter of due process, notice to the parties is required. (See Cal. Const., Art. I, § 7; *In re Emily R.* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1351.) Jodee explicitly and knowingly refused to submit written objections. She also refused to submit anything in writing to justify why she should be permitted to argue when she had failed to do so. : Courts have the inherent authority to reconsider and modify their own interim orders.

Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Asimos* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) We do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. (*Ibid*.) The appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001)24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) In the absence of a reporter’s transcript, we must presume substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. (*569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 434, fn. 9.) The appellant also bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error. (*Pool v. City of Oakland* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069.) Reversal is not required where there is an independent basis to support a judgment. (*Widson v. : The appellant bears the burden of creating a complete and adequate record for appellate review. Without a sufficient record, the appellate court cannot properly assess the trial court’s findings.

Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) Indeed, while this appeal was pending, the parties stipulated to terminating the conservatorship and to setting a final accounting proceeding before the trial court. R.J. was free to challenge any charges or fee payments at the final accounting proceeding. Given the circumstances, R.J. has not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient, nor has he shown that the alleged deficiency was prejudicial. (See, e.g., *Kimmelman v. Morrison* (1986)477 U.S. 365, 381 [courts apply a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the “ ‘wide range’ ” of reasonable professional assistance]; *People v. Torrez* (1985) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091 [counsel is “not required to make futile motions or indulge in idle acts to appear competent”].) Accordingly, R.J.’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.DISPOSITIONThe post-trial order is affirmed. : A court presumes that an attorney’s performance is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and the claimant must affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was deficient and that the deficiency caused prejudice.

Kucker v. Kucker (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 90

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Rev. Stat. 15-10-201.) Property may be transferred into a trust by a general assignment: “[A] general assignment of a party's real and personal property in a written instrument is sufficiently certain to be legally effective.” (*Ukkestad v. RBS Asset Finance, Inc.* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 156, 162, fn. 6; see also *Kucker v. Kucker* (2011)192 Cal.App.4th 90, 95 [“There is no California authority invalidating a transfer of shares of stock to a trust because a general assignment of personal property did not identify the shares. Nor should there be”].) So, whether the Notes were separate or community property, the Clarks’ transfer of “all of our real, personal, tangible, and intangible property, located in the United States, whether separate property or community property” was sufficient to transfer the Notes. : A general assignment of a party’s real and personal property, even when the specific assets (such as shares of stock) are not itemized, is legally sufficient to effect a valid transfer of those assets into a trust.

L. Byron Culver & Associates v. Jaoudi Industrial & Trading Corp. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 300

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) In its statement of decision, the trial court noted that Albert was not alleging they were valid, and there is no indication that Benjamin asserted that allegation either. A specific argument that was never raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (*L. Byron Culver & Associates v. Jaoudi Industrial & Trading Corp.* (1991)1 Cal.App.4th 300, 306, fn. 4.) DISPOSITION The March 2023 order is affirmed. Albert is awarded his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).) /s/ MESIWALA, J. We concur: /s/ ROBIE, Acting P. : A party may not introduce a new argument on appeal that was never raised and preserved in the trial court; issues not presented to the lower court are deemed waived and are not reviewable on appeal.

Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) However, this argument is not adequately developed in the opening brief and is therefore not cognizable. (See *Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist.* (1995)39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700 [when an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary]; *Singh v. Lipworth* (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817 [points asserted on appeal but not supported by “adequate factual or legal analysis” are forfeited]; *Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. : An issue that lacks a cognizable legal argument or sufficient factual/legal analysis is deemed abandoned/forfeited, and the appellate court need not consider it.

McKoin v. Rosefelt (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 757

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Patrick Media Group, Inc.* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 153, 171, disapproved on another ground in *People v. Rogers* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 330–331 [a trustee can maintain an action on trust property in their own name “without mentioning the trust”]; & *McKoin v. Rosefelt* (1944)66 Cal.App.2d 757, 769 [“‘it is unnecessary for the trustee in the pleadings . . . to describe himself as trustee. He can proceed in the action as though he were the owner of the claim which he is enforcing. If he does describe himself as trustee the description is treated as surplusage’”].) In sum, Linda had standing to pursue recovery on the Notes and could do so even without mentioning the Trust or identifying herself as trustee in the complaint. : A trustee may sue in his own name as if he were the owner of the claim, and it is not required to identify himself as trustee or reference the trust in the pleadings.

Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Superior Court* (1997)16 Cal.4th 1124, 1132, fn. 3; see also Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., rule 17.1 [“Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest; but [a] trustee of an express trust . . . may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought”].) Linda properly sued in her own name. : A trustee must bring any suit involving trust property in the trustee’s own name because the trust is not a separate legal entity; the trustee is the real party in interest.

Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Martha A. (2025-08-22, G063437) Fairfield* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 229, 234.) This is true regardless of whether the appeal is from an application for fees in the first instance, or an appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial on the issue. With respect to factual findings, there is no abuse of discretion when the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. (*Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin* (2016)4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1006.) We review any pure issues of law de novo. (*Roberts v. United Health Care Services, Inc.* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132, 149.) II\. The Court Erred by Considering Jodee’s Objections The Probate Code addresses objections such as the ones at issue here. : A reviewing court will not find abuse of discretion in a lower court’s factual findings when those findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Newsom v. Superior Court (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1093

Conservatorship of the Estate of You Wei Dong (2025-08-15, A169579) Superior Court* (2020)51 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1097 [applicant must make affirmative factual showing based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for ex parte relief].) Based on the foregoing, the court could have concluded CSC demonstrated an adequate basis to remove Yen as GAL. : An applicant seeking ex parte relief must affirmatively allege, with personal‑knowledge facts, that the moving party will suffer irreparable harm or faces an immediate danger (or otherwise satisfy the statutory basis for such relief).

Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles (1953) 41 Cal.2d 855

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Linda challenges that postjudgment order by a separate appeal pending in this court (case No. G063597). [^8]: Respondents cite two cases in support of this argument, *Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles* (1953)41 Cal.2d 855, 857–858 and *Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc.* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1206–1207. Neither case is relevant, as each involves a situation where the court’s oral pronouncement contradicted its subsequent written order. : An oral court pronouncement that is inconsistent with a later written order is not controlling; the subsequent written order governs the parties’ rights and obligations.

People v. Hopper (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 774

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Nor can he show harm from any omissions. Again, we cannot reverse a judgment without reviewing the entire record. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; *People v. Hopper* (1969)268 Cal.App.2d 774, 778.) And third, Benjamin insists the court relied on false evidence, reached improper inferences, and improperly discounted and credited various testimonies. These claims have no traction in a review for substantial evidence. We do not reweigh the evidence, make our own factual inferences that contradict those of the trial court, or second guess the trial court’s credibility determinations. (*Citizens Business Bank v. : A judgment may not be reversed unless the appellate court reviews the entire trial record; a party must demonstrate that any alleged omission constitutes a material error within that complete record.

People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) These contentions also lack citation to authority and are ultimately unpersuasive. Lay witnesses can generally testify to the mental condition or competency of a testator. (*People v. Webb* (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 402, 412; see also *Jordan v. Great Western Motorways* (1931) 213 Cal. 606, 612 [“Lay witnesses having the requisite opportunity for observation may testify as to the health of another”]; *People v. Rodriguez* (2014)58 Cal.4th 587, 631 [lay witness can testify to facts personally observed].) Benjamin’s concerns go to the weight of the evidence, and that is not part of our review. Second, Benjamin contends there was either a lack of evidence to support certain findings or the trial court failed to identify the supporting evidence or facts. : A lay witness may testify about a person’s mental condition, competency, or health based on observations the witness personally made, even though the witness is not a medical expert. The admissibility of such testimony is limited to the facts the lay witness actually observed.

People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Further, in California when a trustee brings an action in its own name regarding trust property, it is not required to mention the trust. (See *Hassoldt v. Patrick Media Group, Inc.* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 153, 171, disapproved on another ground in *People v. Rogers* (2013)57 Cal.4th 296, 330–331 [a trustee can maintain an action on trust property in their own name “without mentioning the trust”]; & *McKoin v. Rosefelt* (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 757, 769 [“‘it is unnecessary for the trustee in the pleadings . . . to describe himself as trustee. He can proceed in the action as though he were the owner of the claim which he is enforcing. : A trustee may bring a lawsuit concerning trust property in the trustee’s own name without having to identify or describe the trust in the pleadings; the claim may be pursued as if the trustee were the owner of the right.

People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) Woodruff* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 736 (*Woodruff*).) “If [the client] has failed to show that the challenged actions of counsel were prejudicial, a reviewing court may reject the claim on that ground without determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient.” (*People v. Sapp* (2003)31 Cal.4th 240, 263.) “Rarely is ineffective assistance of counsel established on appeal since the record usually sheds no light on counsel’s reasons for action or inaction.” (*Woodruff*, *supra*, at p. 736.) Here, counsel may not have objected to the court’s compensation order for many reasons. R.J. had been under conservatorship before and counsel may have known he would not be charged any fees in light of the value of his estate. : A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be dismissed solely on the ground that the defendant has not shown prejudice, without the court having to evaluate whether counsel’s performance was deficient.

People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) It is usually unfair to the trial court and the adverse party to take advantage of an ostensible error on appeal that could have been addressed and resolved at the trial level and a proper record made for purposes of review. (*People v. Saunders* (1993)5 Cal.4th 580, 590; *Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. : A claim of error that was not timely objected to or preserved at trial is forfeited and cannot be raised on appeal. appellate review is limited to issues that were properly raised and recorded in the trial court.

People v. Torrez (1985) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) Given the circumstances, R.J. has not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient, nor has he shown that the alleged deficiency was prejudicial. (See, e.g., *Kimmelman v. Morrison* (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 381 [courts apply a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the “ ‘wide range’ ” of reasonable professional assistance]; *People v. Torrez* (1985)31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091 [counsel is “not required to make futile motions or indulge in idle acts to appear competent”].) Accordingly, R.J.’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.DISPOSITIONThe post-trial order is affirmed. Each side to bear its own costs on appeal. FAIN, J.[^6] WE CONCUR: HILL, P. J. : Counsel is not obligated to file futile motions or engage in idle actions merely to appear diligent; a lawyer’s performance is judged by whether it was reasonable, not by a requirement to undertake pointless or unnecessary conduct.

People v. Webb (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 402

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) These contentions also lack citation to authority and are ultimately unpersuasive. Lay witnesses can generally testify to the mental condition or competency of a testator. (*People v. Webb* (1956)143 Cal.App.2d 402, 412; see also *Jordan v. Great Western Motorways* (1931) 213 Cal. 606, 612 [“Lay witnesses having the requisite opportunity for observation may testify as to the health of another”]; *People v. Rodriguez* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 631 [lay witness can testify to facts personally observed].) Benjamin’s concerns go to the weight of the evidence, and that is not part of our review. : A lay witness may testify about a person’s mental condition, competency, or health when the witness has personal knowledge of the facts, and such testimony is admissible without the need for expert qualification.

People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) Woodruff* (2018)5 Cal.5th 697, 736 (*Woodruff*).) “If [the client] has failed to show that the challenged actions of counsel were prejudicial, a reviewing court may reject the claim on that ground without determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient.” (*People v. : Ineffective assistance of counsel is established only when the defendant demonstrates that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficient performance caused a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) In the absence of a reporter’s transcript, we must presume substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. (*569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 434, fn. 9.) The appellant also bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error. (*Pool v. City of Oakland* (1986)42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069.) Reversal is not required where there is an independent basis to support a judgment. (*Widson v. International Harvester Co.* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 45, 54.) II *Trust Division after Father’s Death* Benjamin contends there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that trust B held fifty percent of the trust’s assets. : The appellant must affirmatively show that any alleged error was prejudicial—that is, that the error affected the outcome of the case.

Purdy v. Johnson (1917) 174 Cal. 521

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Code, §§ 16007 [trustee has “a duty to make the trust property productive”] & 16010 [trustee has “a duty to take reasonable steps to enforce claims that are part of the trust property”]; see also *Purdy v. Johnson* (1917)174 Cal. 521, 528 [“It was the duty of the trustees to collect [the promissory notes], and they were liable for the amount of them with interest, unless they made it appear that the failure to collect the notes was not due to their fault”]; Col. Rev. : A trustee must take reasonable steps to enforce and collect trust assets, and is liable for any loss of those assets if the failure to collect is attributable to the trustee’s fault.

Roberts v. United Health Care Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Martha A. (2025-08-22, G063437) With respect to factual findings, there is no abuse of discretion when the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. (*Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1006.) We review any pure issues of law de novo. (*Roberts v. United Health Care Services, Inc.* (2016)2 Cal.App.5th 132, 149.) II\. The Court Erred by Considering Jodee’s Objections The Probate Code addresses objections such as the ones at issue here. : Pure questions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal, meaning the appellate court considers them anew without deference to the trial court’s conclusions.

Safai v. Safai (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 233

Conservatorship of the Estate of You Wei Dong (2025-08-15, A169579) Even assuming error, a violation of due process requires reversal only if we cannot say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (*In re Jessica G*. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1189.) Here, the court approved the personal injury settlement, which would have ended Yen’s role as GAL in the litigation. (*Safai v. Safai* (2008)164 Cal.App.4th 233, 245 [guardian ad litem “is a representative of record of a party” to the action].) As explained, *ante*, in part I.A., any subsequent management of the settlement funds falls under the duties of the conservator. (Prob. Code, §2401, subd. (a) [conservator “has the management and control of the estate”]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(3); Prob. : A guardian ad litem is deemed the party’s representative of record in the litigation, standing in for the protected person as a formal participant in the action.

Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. (2025-08-13, F088679) However, this argument is not adequately developed in the opening brief and is therefore not cognizable. (See *Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist.* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700 [when an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary]; *Singh v. Lipworth* (2014)227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817 [points asserted on appeal but not supported by “adequate factual or legal analysis” are forfeited]; *Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. : An appellate court will disregard arguments raised on appeal that lack sufficient factual or legal support, treating such unsupported points as forfeited.

Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Cimmet* (2011)199 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1390--1391 [a probate estate has no capacity to sue or to defend an action; any litigation must be maintained by, or against, the executor or personal representative of the estate].) [^3]: In her opening brief, Rhonda includes citations to a "Related Case Court Transcript," presumably documents from the probate court proceeding. (Boldface omitted.) That transcript is not part of this record. : A probate estate itself has no capacity to initiate or defend a lawsuit; any action must be brought by, or defended against, the estate’s personal representative or executor.

Starcevic v. Pentech Financial Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 365

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Durkee* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 912, 916--917 [while the judgment was renewed, the judgment lien expired because a certified copy of the renewal application was not recorded while the lien was still in effect].) Unless a judgment has been timely renewed, on expiration of the 10-year enforcement period any judgment liens based on the judgment are automatically extinguished. (§ 683.020; see *Starcevic v. Pentech Financial Services, Inc.* (2021)66 Cal.App.5th 365, 381 (*Starcevic*).) 2.Probate CodeSection 686.020 of the Enforcement of Judgments Law states, "After the death of the judgment debtor, enforcement of a judgment against property in the judgment debtor's estate is governed by the Probate Code, and not by [the Enforcement of Judgments Law]." Similarly, section 9300 of the Probate Code states, "[A]fter the death of the : A judgment lien automatically expires when the underlying judgment is not renewed before the statutory 10‑year enforcement period lapses.

Tanner v. Tanner (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 419

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Benjamin timely appeals the March 2023 order, the order denying the motion for new trial, and the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Because his briefs do not challenge the order denying the motion for new trial or the order awarding fees and costs, we dismiss those appeals as abandoned and confine our review to his appeal of the March 2023 order. (See *Tanner v. Tanner* (1997)57 Cal.App.4th 419, 422, fn. 2.) DISCUSSION I *Standard of Review* “In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to : An appeal is considered abandoned—and may be dismissed—when the appellant’s brief does not raise or challenge the specific order, thereby limiting appellate review to the issues actually presented.

Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Asimos* (2016)6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) We do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. (*Ibid*.) The appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) In the absence of a reporter’s transcript, we must presume substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. (*569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 434, fn. 9.) The appellant also bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error. (*Pool v. : Findings of fact from a bench trial are reviewed on a substantial‑evidence basis, with the appellate court giving those findings deference and construing them liberally in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. The court does not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility.

Trolan v. Trolan (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 939

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) We disagree. In construing the terms of a trust, we exercise our independent judgment. (*Estate of Guidotti* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406.) We look at the language used in the trust instrument, and if that language clearly sets forth the intent, we do not consider extrinsic evidence. (*Wells Fargo Bank v. Huse* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 927, 932; *Trolan v. Trolan* (2019)31 Cal.App.5th 939, 949.) Here, the language of the trust is clear. Upon the death of a spouse, trust B consists of that spouse’s “taxable estate *up to* . . . the maximum exemption equivalent allowable for federal estate tax purposes . . . .” Contrary to Benjamin’s view, this language does not provide that trust B consists of the taxable estate that *exceeds* the maximum federal estate tax exemption. : When the language of a trust instrument is clear and unambiguous, it governs the settlor’s intent and extrinsic evidence may not be considered to interpret the trust.

USLIFE Savings & Loan Assn. v. National Surety Corp. (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 336

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Because the information sheet was never formally moved into evidence, we cannot consider it on appeal. (*USLIFE Savings & Loan Assn. v. National Surety Corp.* (1981)115 Cal.App.3d 336, 343.) Benjamin’s assertion that we can consider this document because the trust’s language is ambiguous lacks merit. The language regarding the property held in trust B is clear and not susceptible to Benjamin’s interpretation. (*Trolan v. Trolan,* *supra*, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 949 [court cannot consider extrinsic evidence of trust to give it a meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible].) The fact that Albert attached the information sheet to his original petition does not change our conclusion. : An appellate court may not consider evidence that was not properly offered and admitted at trial; the appellate record is limited to evidence that was moved into the record.

Ukkestad v. RBS Asset Finance, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 156

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Rev. Stat. 15-10-201.) Property may be transferred into a trust by a general assignment: “[A] general assignment of a party's real and personal property in a written instrument is sufficiently certain to be legally effective.” (*Ukkestad v. RBS Asset Finance, Inc.* (2015)235 Cal.App.4th 156, 162, fn. 6; see also *Kucker v. Kucker* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 90, 95 [“There is no California authority invalidating a transfer of shares of stock to a trust because a general assignment of personal property did not identify the shares. : A written general assignment of all of a party’s real and personal property is legally sufficient to effect a valid transfer of those assets, even when the specific items (such as shares or notes) are not individually identified.

Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) Here, as set forth above, the Notes were transferred to the Trust by the general assignment. The Notes were not real property, and *Heggstad* is inapplicable. Neither was Linda required to initiate probate proceedings to obtain court permission to pursue payment under the Notes. One of the primary functions of a revocable inter vivos trust—such as the Trust here—is to “avoid probate upon death.” (*Weber v. Langholz* (1995)39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1583; see also *Zanelli v. : A revocable inter vivos trust is designed to keep its assets out of probate; property transferred to the trust is not subject to probate administration after the settlor’s death.

Wells Fargo Bank v. Huse (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 927

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) We disagree. In construing the terms of a trust, we exercise our independent judgment. (*Estate of Guidotti* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406.) We look at the language used in the trust instrument, and if that language clearly sets forth the intent, we do not consider extrinsic evidence. (*Wells Fargo Bank v. Huse* (1976)57 Cal.App.3d 927, 932; *Trolan v. Trolan* (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 939, 949.) Here, the language of the trust is clear. Upon the death of a spouse, trust B consists of that spouse’s “taxable estate *up to* . . . the maximum exemption equivalent allowable for federal estate tax purposes . . . .” Contrary to Benjamin’s view, this language does not provide that trust B consists of the taxable estate that *exceeds* the maximum federal estate tax exemption. : When the language of a trust instrument is clear and unambiguous, the court must interpret the trust solely by its plain terms and may not resort to extrinsic evidence to alter or supplement that meaning.

Widson v. International Harvester Co. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 45

Garcia v. Garcia (2025-08-13, C098735) Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 434, fn. 9.) The appellant also bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error. (*Pool v. City of Oakland* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069.) Reversal is not required where there is an independent basis to support a judgment. (*Widson v. International Harvester Co.* (1984)153 Cal.App.3d 45, 54.) II *Trust Division after Father’s Death* Benjamin contends there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that trust B held fifty percent of the trust’s assets. In his view, because the value of the trust estate was below the amount of the applicable federal tax exemption, none of the trust estate went to trust B. We disagree. : A judgment may be affirmed on appeal when an independent, adequate basis exists to support the decision, even if other alleged errors are present.

Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178

Sweetwyne P. Barrow v. Rhonda Holmes (2025-08-13, A169131) Hernandez *(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 845, 848].) We review questions of law de novo. (*Ibid*.) We affirm the order if it is correct on any theory, regardless of the trial court's reasoning. (*Young v. Fish & Game Com.* (2018)24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1192--1193.) On appeal, the trial court's ruling is presumed to be correct and it is the appellant's burden to demonstrate error. (*Starcevic*, *supra*, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.) B.*Effective Renewed Judgment*We first address Rhonda's contention that the trial court "erroneously stated" in its order that Barrow had renewed the judgment. Rhonda argues that Barrow did not renew the judgment and, therefore, the judgment expired in 2021, serving as a basis to grant the motion. : An appellate court may affirm a lower‑court order when the result is correct under any viable theory, even if the trial court’s reasoning is different.

Zanelli v. McGrath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 615

Clark v. Smith (2025-08-14, G063394) The Notes were not real property, and *Heggstad* is inapplicable. Neither was Linda required to initiate probate proceedings to obtain court permission to pursue payment under the Notes. One of the primary functions of a revocable inter vivos trust—such as the Trust here—is to “avoid probate upon death.” (*Weber v. Langholz* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1583; see also *Zanelli v. McGrath* (2008)166 Cal.App.4th 615, 633 [a “revocable inter vivos trust [is] a probate avoidance device”] & *Estate of Parrette* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 157, 164 [“‘When a person creates, and transfers property to, an inter vivos trust and the trust estate does not revert to the settlor’s estate on his death, the trust property is not subject to probate administration in the settlor’s estate. : A revocable inter vivos trust functions as a probate‑avoidance mechanism, so property transferred to the trust is not subject to probate administration upon the settlor’s death, even when the settlor retains ownership interests or the power to revoke.

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