Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.J.. - Case Brief

Case Number: F088679
Court: California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District
Date Filed: August 14, 2025

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Holding

The court held that R.J.’s challenges to the trial court’s authorization of periodic fee payments to the Kern County Public Conservator are forfeited because he failed to object at the trial level, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unsupported; consequently, the post‑trial order is affirmed.

Narrative

Lead: In a decision that underscores California’s “no‑surprise” rule for conservatorship fee disputes, the Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court’s order allowing a public conservator to draw periodic payments from a conservatee’s modest estate—despite the conservatee’s belated objections and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Procedural backdrop: R.J., a 37‑year‑old diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, was the subject of a petition filed on April 15, 2024 by the Kern County Public Conservator seeking appointment as both temporary and permanent conservator of the person and estate. After a jury found R.J. “gravely disabled” on September 3, 2024, the trial court entered a comprehensive order on September 5, 2024 appointing the public conservator and, crucially, authorizing “periodic payments … on account to the Public Conservator/Public Guardian” pursuant to Probate Code § 2643(c) and the county’s adopted fee schedule. The order was later amended on January 7, 2025, and the conservatorship terminated by stipulation on February 18, 2025, with a final accounting set for May 14, 2025.

R.J. appealed only the fee‑payment provision, arguing that the court’s reliance on a standardized fee schedule violated Probate Code §§ 2942(b) and 2643(c), and that his counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Welfare and Institutions Code § 5365.

Factual matrix: The petition described R.J. as “gravely disabled” under Welfare and Institutions Code § 5008(h)(1)(A), unable to provide food, clothing, or shelter without involuntary detention. The petition also sought “periodic payments … based on the current Public Conservator/Public Guardian fee schedule,” noting that a graduated schedule would lessen the burden on small estates. R.J.’s estate consisted primarily of $900/month Social Security Income, with no other assets identified. The fee schedule applied a $444 annual charge for estates with cash balances between $201 and $1,999, broken into twelve $37 monthly installments—resulting in roughly $185 of fees for the five‑month conservatorship period.

At trial, the public conservator presented expert testimony confirming R.J.’s gravely disabled status; no party objected to the fee‑schedule request. The trial court, after the jury’s finding, entered an oral order, a minute order, and a written order—all authorizing the periodic payments and noting that they would be subject to review at the next accounting under Probate Code § 2643(c).

Issues on appeal:

Whether R.J.’s failure to object to the fee‑schedule authorization at trial forfeits his right to raise the issue on appeal.
Whether R.J.’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel warrants reversal of the fee‑payment provision.

Court’s analysis:

Forfeiture of the fee‑payment challenge The appellate court emphasized the well‑settled principle that a party waives any claim of error that could have been raised in the trial court. People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580 and Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180 require “fair notice” to the trial court and the opposing party. Here, the petition itself expressly requested periodic payments, the trial court’s order expressly “granted as prayed,” and no objection was made on the record. The court therefore deemed R.J.’s appellate challenge forfeited.

Statutory compliance The court found no conflict with Probate Code §§ 2942(b) and 2643(c). Section 2942(b) directs courts to consider “the actual costs of the services provided” and “whether the compensation … might impose an economic hardship.” The county’s graduated schedule was crafted to reflect those factors, and the order conditioned the payments on subsequent court approval—precisely the mechanism required by § 2643(c). The appellate panel noted that the public conservator’s request was part of the original petition, and the trial court’s order merely gave it effect.

Ineffective assistance claim R.J. invoked Welfare and Institutions Code § 5365, which guarantees a conservatee the right to effective counsel. The court applied the two‑prong Strickland test (as articulated in People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697): (1) deficient performance, and (2) prejudice. The appellate panel observed that counsel’s decision not to object could be strategically sound—allowing the fee schedule to operate and reserving any fee dispute for the final accounting. No record indicated that counsel’s inaction was unreasonable, nor that R.J. suffered prejudice because he could still contest the fees at the May 2025 accounting. Consistent with Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, the court declined to infer deficiency from a lack of objection.

Disposition: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s post‑trial order, holding the fee‑payment provision valid and the ineffective‑assistance claim unavailing. Each side was ordered to bear its own costs.

Implications for practice: This decision reinforces the procedural discipline required in conservatorship litigation. Practitioners must object contemporaneously to any fee‑related provisions, even when the fee schedule appears “reasonable,” because appellate courts will not entertain forfeited issues. Moreover, the ruling clarifies that a county‑adopted graduated fee schedule, when incorporated into the original petition and subject to later accounting review, satisfies Probate Code §§ 2942 and 2643. Attorneys should therefore ensure that fee‑schedule requests are explicitly included in petitions and that any objections are raised at the earliest opportunity—preferably during the post‑trial hearing—so that the record reflects a clear dispute for appellate review.

Unresolved questions linger regarding the scope of “reasonable” fee schedules in larger estates and whether a court may impose a fee schedule that departs from the statutory “just and reasonable” standard without a more detailed factual finding. Future appellate panels may be asked to delineate the line between permissible standardized fees and impermissible “one‑size‑fits‑all” schemes, especially where an estate’s liquidity is marginal.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code § 2643(c) – authorizes periodic payments to a conservator/guardian subject to court review.
Probate Code § 2942(b) – sets the “just and reasonable” compensation standard for public guardians.
Welfare and Institutions Code § 5008(h)(1)(A) – definition of “gravely disabled.”
Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 5350‑5358 – conservatorship powers and placement authority.
Welfare and Institutions Code § 5365 – right to effective assistance of counsel in LPS proceedings.
People v. Saunders, 5 Cal.4th 580 (1993) – forfeiture/waiver of issues not raised at trial.
Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge Dist., 23 Cal.3d 180 (1979) – fairness in appellate review.
People v. Woodruff, 5 Cal.5th 697 (2018) – Strickland two‑prong test for ineffective assistance.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) – presumption of competent counsel.
Conservatorship of A.B., 66 Cal.App.5th 384 (2021) – cited by appellant (distinguishable).